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Articles
PAYMENT OF STUDENT-ATHLETES:
LEGAL & PRACTICAL OBSTACLES
THOMAS R. HURST*
J. GRIER PRESSLY III**
I. INTRODUCTION
Collegiate athletics at the Division I level is a big business. The
National Collegiate Athletics Association ("NCAA") budget during
the 1997-1998 school year was $270 million.' The NCAA recently
signed a contract with CBS, giving the network exclusive rights
through the year 2002 to televise the NCAA Division I Men's Basket-
ball Championship for which the NCAA and its member institu-
tions will receive $1.7 billion. 2  In 1997, the Southeastern
Conference alone received $9 million from the NCAA men's bas-
ketball tournament. 3 The University of Michigan led all Division I
universities in 1996 with over $5 million earned from royalties asso-
ciated with athletic merchandise bearing the school's logo. 4 Nike
* S.T. Dell Research Scholar and Professor of Law, University of Florida Levin
College of Law. University of Wisconsin, A.B.; Harvard University, J.D. This au-
thor dedicates this article to Betsy.
** Associate, Pressly & Pressly, PA. University of Florida (highest honors),
B.A.; University of Florida (with honors),J.D. This author dedicates this article to
his father and mother, Jamie and Katie Pressly.
1. See Allen Barra, Amateur Athletes Are Worth Millions - to NCAA, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 29, 1999, at A26 (discussing theory that NFL and NBA prosper due to NCAA
limitations on student-athletes); see also C. Peter Goplerud III, Pay for Play For Col-
lege Athletes: Now, More Than Ever, 38 S. TEX. L. REv. 1081, 1083 (1997) (stating
NCAA annual budget for 1996-97 as $239 million).
2. See Peter Finney, If They're to Play, Athletes Need Pay, TIMES PICAYUNE (New
Orleans), Mar. 12, 1997, at DI (noting substantial revenue that high profile
schools bring in from bowl games, endorsements, etc.); see also Michael P. Acain,
Revenue Sharing: A Simple Cure For the Exploitation of College Athletes, 18 Lov. L.A. ENr.
L.J. 307, 309 (1998) (discussing revenue generated from televising college bowl
games and NCAA men's haskethall tournament).
3. See Robert N. Davis, Academics and Athletics on a Collision Course, 66 N.D. L.
REv. 239, 255 (1990) (arguing major reform of NCAA needed to reflect current
environment in which student-athletes are required to be more like professionals).
In addition, the Southeastern Conference generated $2.9 million from its own an-
nual basketball tournament. See id.
4. See David Barkholz, Wear No. 1: UM is Roylaties King in Sports Products,
CRAIN'S DETROIT Bus., Mar. 28, 1997, at 20; see also Goplerud, supra note 1, at 1087
(discussing how numerous schools make revenue of over one million dollars due
to popularity of certain student-athletes).
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signed Duke University Coach Mike Krzyzewski to a contract, under
which Duke basketball players would wear Nike shoes, paying him a
$375,000 annual salary with a $1 million dollar signing bonus. 5
When a university's athletic teams experience success on the hard-
wood and gridiron, booster donations flow into the university's ath-
letic department, and enrollment increases at the university.6 In
the past quarter-century, college sports revenues have increased by
an estimated 8000 percent.7 NCAA member schools generated
nearly $3 billion in revenues in 1997-1998.8
The popularity of collegiate men's football and basketball and
women's basketball is largely responsible for the money flowing
into the coaches' coffers, the universities and the NCAA itself. Divi-
sion I student-athletes on full scholarship, however, are limited to
receiving tuition, fees, room, board and books. 9 Nor can student-
athletes receive, in appreciation of their talents and good play, any
money or gifts from boosters or sports agents. 10 The foundation
and justification for the NCAA bylaw limiting compensation contin-
ues to be "amateurism" which espouses the ideal that collegiate ath-
letes play sports for pleasure and physical, mental or social benefits
and as an avocation rather than a vocation."' Compensating ama-
teur athletes in the form of monetary payments has been viewed as
5. See Sharp Gains in Salaries Enjoyed by NCAA Basketball Coaches, SPORTS INDUS.
NEWS, Mar. 28, 1997, at 117. Roy Williams of the University of Kansas and Lute
Olson of the University of Arizona are other Division I basketball coaches who
benefit from shoe contracts paying them more than $400,000 each year. See id.
6. See Lee Goldman, Sports and Antitrust: Should College Students Be Paid To
Play?, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 206 (1990) (revealing direct and indirect revenues
generated by college athletics).
7. See Barra, supra note 1, at A26 (expressing amazement at NCAA's success in
representing its members in marketing matters).
8. See id. (comparing college sports to professional sports).
9. See NCAA, 1999-2000 NCAA MANUAL [hereinafter NCAA MANUAL]
§ 15.02.5.1 (1999) ("Divisions I and II. A full grant-in-aid is financial aid that con-
sists of tuition and fees, room and board and required course related fees.").
10. See id. § 16.02.3. Such payments would be "extra benefits" prohibited by
§ 16.02.3. See also NCAA CONST. art. II, § 13:
A student-athlete may receive athletically related financial aid adminis-
tered by the institution without violating the principle of amateurism,
provided that amount does not exceed the cost of education authorized
by the Association; however, such aid as defined by the Association shall
not exceed the cost of attendance as published by each institution. Any
other financial assistance, except that received from one upon whom the
student-athlete is naturally or legally dependent, shall be prohibited un-
less specifically authorized by the Association.
Id.
11. See Stephen M. Schott, Give Them What They Deserve: Compensating the Stu-
dent-Athlete for Participation in Intercollegiate Athletics, 3 SPORTS LAwJ. 25, 30 (1996).
[Vol. 7: p. 55
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contrary to the amateurism ideal. 12 However, the reality of col-
legiate athletics is inconsistent with the amateurism ideal advanced
by the NCAA, as studies have revealed that only forty percent of
Division I student-athletes participate in collegiate sports for the
"fun of it."13 In addition, Pennsylvania State University football
coach Joe Paterno has written about the conflict between the non-
NCAA "amateur" track and field athletes and the NCAA paragon of
amateurism.' 4 Furthermore, the famous classicist David C. Young
reported that the prohibition of compensation was not fundamen-
tal to ancient Greek athletics, the purported origin of the "amateur-
ism" ideal. 15 In response to the growing commercialism in
collegiate athletics and the realization that "amateurism" is a false
ideal, substantial support has emerged for compensating Division I
student-athletes in addition to their scholarships.
Proponents of compensating student-athletes in excess of the
allowable scholarship amount argue that student-athletes should be
paid because many of them need the money.' 6 Full scholarships do
not provide student-athletes with any spending money.17 Thus, it is
difficult for many student-athletes, especially those from disadvan-
taged socio-economic backgrounds, to go out on dates or even re-
turn home for a family emergency. Only in 1996 did the NCAA
pass an amendment to the bylaws, allowing student-athletes to ob-
tain part-time employment during the school year, which permits
12. See id. at 31 (explaining evolution of concept of amateurism and incorrect
assumption that it originated in ancient Greece).
13. See Allen L. Sack, College Sports and the Student-Athlete, I IJ. SPORT & Soc.
ISSUEs 31, 43 (Winter 1988) (comparing survey results of athletes from NCAA Divi-
sion I, II, III and Ivy League for educational and athletic experiences); see also
Kenneth L. Shropshire, Legislation for the Glory of Sport: Amateurism and Compensa-
tion, 1 SETON HALLJ. SPORT L. 7, 17 (1991) (discussing survey results of student-
athletes and their perceptions of amateurism and compensation, also suggesting
NCAA has forced any additional payments to student-athletes underground
thereby protecting myth of amateurism).
14. See JOE PATERNO & BERNARD ASBELL, PATERNO: BY THE BOOK 184 (1989). A
passage in the book reads, "Carl Lewis... became a millionaire while remaining
an amateur. All kinds of endorsement money was dumped on him, and all legal as
logasternnaeyn paid toa t-St fund instead oF diret], tn I -;. Th~r'c en,
in track, but not in [NCAA] football. Don't ask me why." Id. See also Shropshire,
supra note 13, at 18. Student-athletes are permitted to participate on a profes-
sional sports team which is not the same as their collegiate sports so long as they
are not on scholarship. See id.
15. See DAVID C. YOUNG, THE OLYMPIC MYTH OF GREEK AMATEUR ATHLETICS 7
(1985). The ancient Greeks regularly competed for valuable prizes in other games
before they reached the Olympics, and they openly profited from athletics when-
ever they could. See id.; see also Shropshire, supra note 13, at 9-11 (explaining that
amateurism ideal was not Greek, rather it was introduced later).
16. See Schott, supra note 11, at 49.
17. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 9, § 15.02.5.1.
2000]
3
Hurst: Payment of Student-Athletes: Legal & (and) Practical Obstacles
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2000
58 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAW JOURNAL
student-athletes to make up the difference between the value of an
athletic scholarship and the university's "full cost of attendance."18
However, the tremendous time demands - be it class, exams, prac-
tice, games, or work-outs - placed on student-athletes make part-
time jobs during the school year unrealistic, not to mention the
potential enforcement nightmares in controlling overeager boost-
ers who would be providing the jobs in many instances. 19 Further-
more, the recent amendment seems to be at odds with the
purported NCAA priority on education. 20 Qualified student-ath-
letes may receive a Pell grant of up to $2400, and the NCAA allows
student-athletes to receive money from its special assistance fund
when a hardship or an emergency creates unmet needs. Many stu-
dent-athletes, however, either do not qualify for such assistance, are
unaware it exists, or have needs that outweigh the permissible
amounts. 21 Lack of accessibility of necessary funds may justify stu-
dent-athletes' willingness, in the vast majority of cases, to accept ille-
gal payments from sports agents and university boosters.22
Proponents of compensating student-athletes beyond the
amount of athletic scholarships argue that fairness requires that stu-
dent-athletes be paid. The value of a four-year athletic scholarship
at a state university is approximately $30,000 while the value of the
same scholarship at a private university may exceed $120,000.23
Popular and talented student-athletes may generate millions of dol-
lars for their schools during the course of their collegiate careers,
18. See id. § 15.2.6 (outlining how earnings from employment are factored
into determination of whether full grant-in-aid has been reached). Prior to the
amendment, student-athletes could only obtain employment during the summer
months. See id.
19. See Acain, supra note 2, at 316 (discussing how part-time job would sub-
tract from precious study time and possibility that boosters might use opportunity
to provide student-athletes with additional money under the table).
20. See id.
21. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 9, § 15.2.4.1 (noting that Pell grants are not
included when determining permissible amount of full grant-in-aid or cost of at-
tendance of student-athlete); see also Athletes Gain Greater Access to Assistance Fund,
NCAA NEWS, May 13, 1996, at 1 (outlining changes made in 1996 to NCAA special
assistance fund); Goplerud, supra note 1, at 1084-85 (explaining changes to special
assistance fund in May 1996, such as expansion of pool of eligible athletes and
restrictions on use).
22. See Goplerud, supra note 1, at 1085-86 (discussing NCAA's concern that
financial hardships created by Pell grant and emergency fund restrictions tempt
student-athletes to accept gifts and arguing that NCAA's attempts to make changes
to remove temptation are insufficient).
23. See Acain, supra note 2, at 313 (arguing that universities' contentions that
athletic scholarships provide adequate compensation fail to consider disparity be-
tween value of scholarship and revenue generated by athletes and that NCAA rules
were created before this disparity existed).
[Vol. 7: p. 55
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in the form of coaches' shoe and apparel contracts, merchandise
sales, increased booster donations, television packages and in-
creased student enrollment. 24
Opponents of proposals to pay student-athletes argue that the
education provided by an athletic scholarship is valuable and suffi-
cient compensation. However, in a recent survey of professional
football and basketball players, over two-thirds admitted that they
never received a college degree.2 5 A striking number of student-
athletes who did in fact earn their college degrees, still admitted
that they attended college for the sole purpose of playing sports
and devoted little of their time to their education. 26
Opponents to proposals to pay student-athletes also argue that
the athletic scholarship is adequate compensation because col-
legiate athletics can act as a stage for scouts from the NFL, NBA and
the WNBA, where lucrative professional careers await student-ath-
letes. The reality is that an extremely low number of collegiate ath-
letes will parlay their athletic scholarships into professional sports
careers. 27 Furthermore, unlike non-scholarship university students,
student-athletes are prohibited from profiting from their talents
due to the NCAA limited compensation bylaw; a talented engineer-
ing student who develops a patent, assuming he or she has not con-
tracted away patent rights to the university, may profit without
restriction from any profits earned from the patent.28 Equity seem-
ingly demands that student-athletes share in the financial success of
intercollegiate athletics.
24. See Goldman, supra note 6, at 206 (asserting that NCAA's idea of "ama-
teurism" is mere pretense and deception).
25. See id. at 206-07 n.10 (discussing academic abuses at universities).
26. See Timothy Davis, An Absence of Good Faith: Defining a University's Educa-
tional Obligation to Student-Athletes, 28 Hous. L. REv. 743 (1991) (clarifying popular
misconceptions that student-athletes attend schools solely to play sports by offering
statistical data that student-athletes believe earning degree is very important).
27. See Burton J. Kinerk, The Illusory Dream That Drives College Sports, SPORTS
I .. , 1a.-.-. eb~1. 196 a~l-t 12. StC,--c.-, sugges-.at thant each year th . rp_ -I,-rflvl
mately 2600 seniors playing college basketball, 2.5 percent of whom will find a
place on the roster of an NBA team; there are approximately 9500 seniors playing
college football, 2.2 percent of whom will find a roster spot on an NFL team. See
id.; see also C. Peter Goplerud III, Stipends for Collegiate Athletes: A Philosophical Spin
on a Controversial Proposal, 5 KAN.J.L. & PUB. POL' 125, 126 (1996) (explaining that
while many student-athletes are enticed to attend schools to prepare them for ca-
reer as professional athlete, most will not continue on to professional sports).
28. See Steve Murphy &Jonathan Pace, A Plan For Compensating Student-Athletes,
BYU EDUC. & L.J., 167, 174 (1994) (discussing flaws in universities' justification for
limited compensation rule that scholarship is adequate compensation for playing
sport).
2000]
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Although proponents of paying student-athletes have advanced
numerous proposals, 29 the proposal which has garnered the great-
est support has been the payment of a monthly stipend to Division I
student-athletes in the revenue-producing sports (on most cam-
puses, these sports consist of men's football and basketball and wo-
men's basketball), and to an equivalent number of women student-
athletes in order to comply with Title IX. Under this plan, the indi-
vidual universities would select the amount of the stipend and a
"salary cap" would be established to preserve competition.30 In the
interest of simplicity in the antitrust discussion, this paper will limit
its scope to the potential legal and practical consequences of adopt-
ing the stipend with salary cap proposal.
II. ANTITRUST ISSUES
The stipend proposal potentially could be viewed as price-fix-
ing which violates the Sherman Antitrust Act. The Sherman Act
provides that " [e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among
the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be ille-
gal." 31 The United States Supreme Court has long held that only
unreasonable restraints of trade are proscribed by the Act. 32 It is
readily apparent that the NCAA and its member institutions engage
in interstate commerce with such activities as nationwide recruiting
of student-athletes, nationwide ticket sales, nationally televised
games and inter-collegiate competition. In addition, courts gener-
ally have held that NCAA restraints on collegiate athletics involve
interstate commerce. 33 However, the Supreme Court has recog-
29. See Acain, supra note 2, at 307-53. The author proposed a market-based
revenue-sharing plan. See id. Such a plan would be cost-prohibitive, difficult to
implement, involve high transaction costs and result in collegiate athletics taking
on aspects of professional sports. See id. at 336-45; see also Goplerud, supra note 27,
at 125-31 (proposing fixed stipend payment).
30. See Goplerud, supra note 1, at 1081-1105. The idea proposed by Goplerud
consists of stipends given to student-athletes. See id. at 1089. While schools could
decide the exact amount of the stipend, the salary cap would be set at $300 per
month. See id. Half of the stipend would go into a trust fund to be paid to the
athletes who receive degrees within five years. See id. The proposal would also
allow student-athletes to work because the stipend would not count against the cost
of attendance. See id.
31. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
32. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 55-56 (1911) (discussing
origin of Sherman Act and analysis to be applied when approaching individuals).
33. See NCAA v. Miller, 10 F.3d 633, 638 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that Nevada
statute, requiring any national collegiate athlete association to provide certain pro-
cedural due process protections to anyone in situation where sanctions may be
imposed, is unconstitutional because it violated Commerce Clause); Hennessey v.
[Vol. 7: p. 55
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nized that certain types of restrictive activities by the NCAA may be
permitted under the Sherman Act in order to preserve inter-col-
legiate competition as a product.34 As a result, the Supreme Court
has consistently analyzed antitrust challenges to NCAA regulations
under the more lenient "rule of reason" rather than the per se
rule.35 The per se rule is utilized for commercial restrictions that
would "almost always" be found illegal.36 Under the per se rule, the
plaintiff is not required to show that the restraint leads to a de-
crease in competition, and the court will not consider any of the
defendant's purported explanations for the restraint; in essence,
the restraint will be held to be "unreasonable" and a violation of
antitrust law.3 7 In contrast, the "rule of reason" provides defend-
ants an opportunity to present justifications for the restraint.
Under the "rule of reason" analysis, the plaintiff must prove that
the restraint has anti-competitive effects.38 If the plaintiff meets
that burden, the defendant must show that the restraint is in fact
pro-competitive; if the defendant meets its burden, then the re-
straint will be upheld as a "reasonable" restraint.3 9
NCAA, 564 F.2d 1136, 1148 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding NCAA is not exempt from
Sherman Act even though its activities and objectives are educational and apply to
amateur athletes); see also Acain, supra note 2, at 319-20 (discussing how scheduling
games which require traveling to another state and regulating nationwide high
school athlete recruiting establish interstate involvement).
34. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 119 (1984)
(stating that recruitment regulations, limitations on the number of scholarship per
team and other standards are sufficient to improve competition); see also
Goplerud, supra note 1, at 1090 (explaining that in order to keep collegiate sports,
horizontal restraints on competition are necessary). Otherwise, regulations relat-
ing to equipment, field size and length of seasons would be illegal. See id.
35. See Banks v. NCAA, 977 F.2d 1081, 1088 (7th Cir. 1992) (following ruling
in Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., court addressed allegations that NCAA rules
restrain trade or commerce under rule of reason); McCormack v. NCAA, 845 F.2d
1338, 1344 (5th Cir. 1988) (following ruling in NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, and apply-
ing "rule of reason" analysis to determine whether restraint enhances competi-
tion); Law v. NCAA, 902 F. Supp. 1394, 1403 (D. Kan. 1995) (qualifying holding to
state belief that Supreme Court did not intend to give NCAA carte blanche power
in imposing restraints on its member institutions or other parties because of its
role in marketplace).
36. See, e.g., Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 3t1 UJ.S. 593 (L51)
(applying per se rule to horizontal market division); United States v. Trenton Pot-
teries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927) (applying per se rule to price fixing).
37. See United States v. Scocony-Vacumn Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) (clarify-
ing that Court hesitates to make test of legality whether prices are reasonable); see
also Acain, supra note 2, at 323 (discussing while horizontal price fixing has been
considered classic example of illegal per se restraint, courts considering NCAA's
justifications have strayed from per se analysis).
38. See Acain, supra note 2, at 325-26.
39. See United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 678-79 (3d Cir. 1993) (hold-
ing that agreement between Ivy League school to award financial aid based solely
on need could be allowed if program has pro-competitive and non-economic goals
2000]
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The NCAA limited compensation bylaw is anti-competitive be-
cause, instead of freely competing for student-athletes, universities
are compelled to limit their compensation packages to amounts
specified by NCAA regulations. Courts on two occasions have ad-
dressed whether the NCAA engages in illegal price-fixing when it
limits the amount of financial aid a university may offer a student-
athlete in an athletic scholarship.
In NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma,40 the
Boards of Regents of the University of Georgia and University of
Oklahoma challenged, under the Sherman Act, an NCAA rule
which placed a ceiling on the number of basketball games member
universities could televise. Although the Supreme Court recog-
nized that the NCAA created a horizontal restraint by enforcing a
rule which prevented free competition for television rights, the
Court refused to apply the per se rule to the NCAA restriction.41
Instead, the Court analyzed the regulation under the "rule of rea-
son" and allowed the NCAA to present justifications for the restric-
tion. 42 The Court did not address directly the legality of the NCAA
limited compensation bylaw in holding that the NCAA television
restriction violated the Sherman Act. In dicta, the Court indicated
that the limited compensation bylaw, among other NCAA regula-
tions, actually enhances competition and would thereby satisfy a
and agreement is necessary to achieve those goals); see also Acain, supra note 2, at
326 (analyzing judicial application between commercial and educational markets
and concluding that restrictions are usually upheld).
40. 468 U.S. 85, 95 (1984). The College Football Association ("CFA") was
created to "promote the interests of major football playing schools within the
NCAA structure." Id. at 89. The NCAA enacted a plan to televise football games,
which limited the number of times a team could be televised and the amount of
money a team could make. See id. at 93-94. In 1979, the CFA decided it wanted
more input into the plan to televise football games. See id. at 94. The CFA ex-
plored the possibility of its own television agreements and received a contract offer
from NBC. See id. at 94-95. The NCAA announced that it would take disciplinary
action against any CFA member who complied with the new contract. See id. at 95.
41. See id. at 99-101. A horizontal restraint is an agreement among competi-
tors on the way in which they will compete with one another. See id. Courts apply
the per se rule when "the practice facially appears to be one that would always or
almost always tend to restrict competition and decrease output." Id. at 100 (citing
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1979)). The per se rule was
not applied because the industry requires horizontal restraints if the product is to
be available at all. See id. at 107.
42. See id. at 103. The Court held that a fair evaluation required considera-
tion of the NCAA's justifications for the restraints. See id. The rule of reason test
allows the court to determine whether a restraint is unreasonable based on the
surrounding circumstances and their impact on competitive conditions. See id.
[Vol. 7: p. 55
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"rule of reason" analysis because it preserves education and ama-
teurism in collegiate athletics.
43
McCormack v. NCAA 44 is the only case in which a court has ad-
dressed directly whether the NCAA limited compensation bylaw vio-
lated the Sherman Act. In McCormack, an alumnus of Southern
Methodist University ("SMU") brought a class action lawsuit against
the NCAA on behalf of SMU alumni and SMU football players in
response to the NCAA's suspension of SMU's football program for
the 1987 season.45 The NCAA imposed this sanction after it found
that SMU had violated the limited compensation bylaw through ille-
gal booster payments to football players. 46 Plaintiffs alleged that
the NCAA limited compensation bylaw constituted price-fixing in
violation of antitrust laws. 47 The United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit applied the "rule of reason" in lieu of the per se
test, and relied on dicta from Board of Regents of the University of
Oklahoma in holding that the NCAA limited compensation bylaw
was "reasonable" and not in violation of the Sherman Act.4 8
The court's reasoning in McCormack is unpersuasive as it relies
on dicta from Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma rather
than making its own independent antitrust analysis. The holding in
Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma is binding only as to the
anti-competitive nature of NCAA television packages. 49 In addition
to being mentioned only in dicta, the discussion of payment to col-
lege athletes in Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma was un-
reasoned obiter dictum.50 The Supreme Court in Board of Regents of
the University of Oklahoma suggested that anti-competitive NCAA re-
strictions would be "reasonable" under the "rule of reason" if such
restrictions advanced education and amateurism in collegiate ath-
43. See id. at 118-19 (stating that limitations are effectively imposed by mem-
ber schools who will not be affected and that limitation affects important source of
revenue for some member schools).
44. 845 F.2d 1338 (5th Cir 188).
45. See id. at 1340 (alleging that players' careers were destroyed, cheerleaders
suffered mental anguish and students and alumni were deprived of right to attend
football games and to support their team).
46. See id.
47. See id. at 1343-44 (holding that eligibility rules restricting compensation
are not presumed to be illegal).
48. See id. at 1343 (holding that NCAA's eligibility rules are reasonable).
49. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 95, 120 (1984).
50. See Goldman, supra note 6, at 213 (recognizing that subsequent cases re-
lied on dicta from opinion without conducting independent analysis).
2000]
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letics. 51 As argued in the introduction, the NCAA's restraints on
payments to student-athletes do not further education or amateur-
ism. 52 Education is not a priority for student-athletes, their coaches
or in many cases, the universities themselves, despite recent efforts,
reflected in Proposition 16,53 to increase freshmen initial eligibility
standards. 54 The concept of amateurism in collegiate athletics has
been outdated by the realities of the present. Therefore, if future
courts applied their own independent and thorough antitrust anal-
ysis, rather than relying exclusively on Board of Regents of the Univer-
sity of Oklahoma or McCormack, they likely would find the NCAA
limited compensation bylaw violates the Sherman Act.55 Doing so
would recognize the restriction on payments to student-athletes for
what it is - not a regulation promoting competition, education and
amateurism, but rather a regulation aimed at saving universities'
money.
Whether courts ultimately find that the NCAA limited compen-
sation bylaw violates antitrust laws, courts potentially could find that
the stipend proposal constitutes price-fixing in violation of the
Sherman Act, especially in light of the recent multi-million dollar
settlement arising out of the "restricted earnings coach" case. In
Law v. NCAA, 5 6 a Kansas federal district judge found the NCAA in
violation of the Sherman Act in a challenge to an NCAA regulation
placing a limit on the salaries for "restricted earnings" coaches. 5 7
51. See Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. at 120 (holding that NCAA's
television broadcast plan "restricted rather than enhanced the place of intercolle-
giate athletics in the Nation's life.") Id.
52. For the discussion of how the NCAA's restraints on payments do not fur-
ther education or amateurism, see supra notes 13-28 and accompanying text.
53. Proposition 16 set the initial eligibility requirement for both standardized
test scores and grade point averages ("GPA") on a sliding scale. Proposition 16
raised the number of core courses from eleven to thirteen and required a 2.5 GPA,
rather than a 2.0 GPA formerly required under Proposition 48.
54. See Cureton v. NCAA, No. Civ.A.97-131, 1997 WL 634376, at *1 (E.D. Pa.
Oct. 9, 1997) (enjoining NCAA from basing freshman initial eligibility on stan-
dardized test score, reasoning that tests are discriminatory).
55. See Acain, supra note 2, at 331 (reasoning that student-athletes are not
really amateurs because they receive compensation in form of tuition, room and
board, and books); see also Goldman, supra note 6, at 213 (recognizing that anti-
trust analysis involving payment to college athletes in Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of
Okla. was dicta and was incorrectly followed by McCormack).
56. 902 F. Supp. 1394 (D. Kan. 1995).
57. See Law, 902 F. Supp. at 1394 (applying rule of reason, court found that
"restricted earnings" coach rule was not reasonably necessary and, therefore, was
in violation of Sherman Act). The court awarded $22.3 million in damages, an
amount which was tripled after the application of the treble damages clause in the
Sherman Act. See id. In February 1999, the NCAA and the plaintiffs reached a
$54.5 million settlement agreement. See id.
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The case originated from an NCAA cost-cutting measure which lim-
ited "restricted earnings" Division I basketball coaches to an annual
salary of $12,000 that is assumed and not supported in the opin-
ion.58 Under the regulation, each basketball program was allowed
one of these "restricted earnings" coaches in addition to one head
coach and two assistants. 59 Several "restricted earnings" coaches
challenged the NCAA regulation under antitrust laws asserting that
the restriction was in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act.60 The
court agreed, rejecting the NCAA's argument that the regulation
was in fact pro-competitive because it would save the NCAA from
financial ruin, thus preserving the collegiate competition that the
NCAA promotes, and thus, the court found the NCAA to be in vio-
lation of the Sherman Act.6 1
Courts would certainly cite Law in striking down a fixed pay-
ment stipend as violative of the Sherman Act. However, the non-
fixed payment stipend proposal coupled with a "salary cap" poten-
tially could survive antitrust scrutiny so long as the proposal had the
support of the student-athletes and was the result of a collective
bargaining agreement.62 Under the non-statutory labor exemp-
tion, antitrust laws have no application to collective bargaining
agreements. 63 After all, courts have approved the team salary caps
incorporated by many of the professional leagues, including the
NBA and NFL.64 Still, the NCAA might be hesitant to adopt a regu-
lation that would risk another enormous judgment or settlement if
a court found the NCAA liable for antitrust violations, because the
member institutions would ultimately pick up the bill.
65
58. See id. at 1400 (limiting salary of "restricted earnings" coaches was one of
several measures proposed by NCAA Cost Reduction Committee to curtail increas-
ing institutional costs).
59. See id. (allowing "restricted earnings" coach to earn additional income by
performing duties outside athletic department).
60. See id. at 1397 (alleging that Division I members of NCAA conspired to
limit compensation of "restricted earnings" coaches).
61. See id. at 1410 (finding that NCAA's restraint on "restricted earnings"
coaches was not reasonably necessary).
62. SeeAcain, supra note 2, at 343 (reasoning that true compettiion in cCi it-
ing "star athletes" between Universities would result). Certainly a market-based
revenue-sharing plan would not constitute price-fixing in violation of the Sherman
Act. For a discussion of the possible problems of collective bargaining by student-
athletes, see infra notes 99-105 and accompanying text.
63. See NBA v. Williams, 45 F.3d 684, 693 (2d Cir. 1995) (concluding that
application of antitrust principles to collective bargaining relationship would dis-
rupt collective bargaining as we know it).
64. See id. at 692 (citing Powell v. NFL, 930 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1989).
65. For a discussion of NCAA's violation of the Sherman Act by placing a limit
on the salaries of "restricted earnings" coaches, see supra notes 58-67 and accompa-
nying text.
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III. WORKERS' COMPENSATION ISSUES
If the NCAA adopted the stipend proposal and commenced
paying Division I student-athletes who participate in revenue-pro-
ducing sports, it is likely that in most jurisdictions the student-ath-
letes receiving stipends would then be covered by the workers'
compensation laws of those states. 66 "Workers' compensation laws
are state statutes enacted to compensate employees for job-related
injuries or death, regardless of fault."67 Generally, only those de-
fined as "employees" are covered by the workers' compensation
statutes. 68 In addition, only employees who are "injured or killed in
actions arising out of the 'scope of employment' are covered by the
statutes."69 Therefore, workers applying for the workers' compen-
sation coverage must meet a two prong requirement: (1) employees
must be covered, and (2) act within the scope of their employment
when they suffer injury or death.70 Coverage would therefore have
a financial and practical impact on universities.
As the workers' compensation statutes in the majority of juris-
dictions do not expressly address coverage of scholarship student-
athletes, 71 the major hurdle facing scholarship student-athletes
seeking to receive workers' compensation benefits, including stu-
66. See Goplerud, supra note 1, at 1092. Currently, universities pay for any
required surgery and accompanying physical therapy that results from injury. See
id.
67. ARTHUR LARSON, WORKER'S COMPENSATION LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND
TEXT (1992); see also Goplerud, supra note 1, at 1094 (recognizing "legal and finan-
cial considerations" that workers' compensation coverage would bring to athletic
programs).
68. For a discussion of workers' compensation law, see Goplerud, supra note
1, at 1095.
69. Id. (stating that "the ultimate question becomes whether the incident in-
volved a covered employee who was acting in the course of her employment when
the injury or death occurred").
70. The focus will be on the "employee" requirement. The "scope of employ-
ment" requirement would take on a different twist, as most people do not associate
sports with employment. However, in the workers' compensation context, student-
athletes who receive a stipend would take a role akin to a professional athlete, who
the law has held to be acting within the scope of employment during or in prepara-
tion for a game. Assuming that the student-athlete was injured during or in prepa-
ration for a game, whether it be practice or workouts, it certainly would be
considered that the injury took place during the student-athlete's "scope of
employment."
71. See Goplerud, supra note 1, at 1095. New York "specifically excludes 'ama-
teur' athletes from its definition of 'employee."' Id. (citing N.Y. WORKERS' COMP.
LAw § 2 (1) (McKinney 1993)). California and Hawaii specifically exclude "schol-
arship athletes" from their definitions of "employee." See id. at 1095-96 (citing CAL.
LAB. CODE § 3352(k) (West 1989) and HAW. REV. STAT. § 386-1(3) (1995)). "Ne-
vada, on the other hand, specifically includes 'collegiate athletes' within its defini-
tion of 'employee."' Id. at 1096 (citing NEV. REV. STAT. § 616.251 (1995)).
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dent-athletes who would be receiving stipend payments, would be
to establish an employment relationship with the university or the
university's athletic department as employer and the student-ath-
lete as employee. 72 The recent judicial trend has seen courts deny
coverage to student-athletes who sought to establish an employ-
ment relationship between their universities and them based upon
the universities providing them with athletic scholarships.73 The
reasoning has focused on the purported amateur nature of col-
legiate athletics and the NCAA's own description of collegiate ath-
letics as an avocation rather than a vocation.74
In Rensing v. Indiana State University Board of Trustees,7 5 the Indi-
ana Supreme Court held that an employment relationship did not
exist between an injured student-athlete and the university on the
basis of the university providing the plaintiff student-athlete an ath-
letic scholarship, and, therefore, the student-athlete was not enti-
tled to workers' compensation coverage. 76 Rensing, a scholarship
football player who was paralyzed while making a tackle during
practice, sought compensation for permanent total disability as well
as medical and hospital expenses. 77 Although the court acknowl-
edged that Rensing agreed to certain obligations to the university
to keep his scholarship, the court ultimately focused on the lack of
intent between Rensing and the university to form an employer-
employee relationship as well as NCAA policies regarding amateur-
ism and education as a priority. 78
Coleman v. Western Michigan University79 involved facts similar to
those in Rensing. Coleman, a scholarship football player injured
during football practice, based his claim for workers' compensation
benefits on his receipt of an athletic scholarship from the univer-
72. The University of Florida and other athletically successful universities
have formed athletic departments which are independent of the university itself.
73. See Rensing v. Ind. State Univ. Bd. of Trs., 444 N.E.2d 1170 (Ind. 1983)
(finding that student-athlete injured in football practice was not "employee"); see
also Coleman v. W. Mich. Univ., 336 N.W.2d 224 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983) (finding
that student-athlete injured in football practice was not "employee").
74. £"Cplerud,~r note 1, at 109O7 (rcgiigta tltsO coa
ship generally have been found not to be covered by workers' compensation laws).
75. 444 N.E.2d 1170 (Ind. 1983).
76. See id. at 1175 (concluding that Rensing was not employee of university
under Workman's Compensation Act, but he was student-athlete).
77. See id. at 1170-71 (arguing there was employer-employee relationship
under Workman's Compensation Act).
78. See id. at 1174-75 (recognizing that courts in other jurisdictions have
found that scholarship students are not considered "employees" under the Work-
man's Compensation Act "unless they are employed in a universityjob in addition
receiving scholarship benefits").
79. 336 N.W.2d 224 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983).
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sity.8 0 Instead of applying the intent test as the Rensing court did,
the Michigan Court of Appeals applied the economic reality test in
finding that no employment relationship existed between Coleman
and the university, and therefore, Coleman was not entitled to
workers' compensation coverage.81 Under the economic reality
test, the court considered the university's right to control Coleman
as a scholarship athlete, the university's right to discipline him and
the payment or lack of payment of wages.8 2 In addition, the court
considered whether the task performed by Coleman, playing foot-
ball, was an integral part of the university's business.8 3 In denying
that the student-athlete's football playing was an integral part of the
university's business, the court refused workers' compensation ben-
efits for Coleman.8 4
Critics have questioned the reasoning advanced in the Rensing
and Coleman opinions.8 5 The court in Rensing supported its deci-
sion to deny the student-athlete workers' compensation benefits
with an intent test, which is not as widely used as the economic
reality test in the workers' compensation "employee" analysis. 86 In
addition, the court in Rensing relied on the education and amateur-
ism ideals advanced by the NCAA, 87 two concepts criticized in the
introduction to this Article.88 While the court in Coleman analyzed
the employment relationship issue under the more popular eco-
nomic reality test, the court concluded that the football program at
the university was not an integral part of the university's business.89
It is not difficult to find fault in such a conclusion. On the
majority of the college campuses, a successful football program
brings with it increased booster donations, increased student en-
80. See id. at 225 (claiming he was employee for purposes of Worker's Disabil-
ity Compensation Act).
81. See id. at 228 (finding that plaintiff was not "employee" of defendant
within purpose of Act).
82. See id. at 225 (requiring examination of four factors to determine if em-
ployment relationship existed).
83. See id. at 225-26 (noting that none of four factors are dispositive).
84. See Coleman, 336 N.W.2d at 227-28 (reasoning that university was in pri-
mary business of providing academic education).
85. See Goplerud, supra note 27, at 128 (questioning analysis of Rensing and
Coleman courts).
86. See id.
87. See Rensing, 444 N.E.2d at 1173 (recognizing policy of NCAA that student-
athlete is student first and foremost).
88. For a discussion of amateurism and education in college athletics, see
supra notes 11-15, 23-26 and accompanying text.
89. See Coleman, 336 N.W.2d at 224 (finding that university's academic pro-
gram would likely remain effective without presence of football program).
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rollment and revenue to fund the non-revenue sports on campus.90
Thus, if a future court conducts an independent analysis of the na-
ture of the relationship between universities and scholarship stu-
dent-athletes, the recent trend of denying workers' compensation
coverage to student-athletes seeking to establish an employer-em-
ployee relationship based on their receipt of athletic scholarships,
potentially may be short-lived.
If the NCAA commenced making stipend payments to student-
athletes, student-athletes would unquestionably qualify as "employ-
ees" under the state workers' compensation statutes because the sti-
pend would represent a wage paid for services rendered.9 1 Student-
athletes would be entitled to workers' compensation coverage
under the intent test, economic reality test or any other test used by
courts. A fair comparison would be the workers' compensation cov-
erage provided by universities to teaching assistants. 9 2 University
teaching assistants generally receive a tuition scholarship in addi-
tion to a stipend and receive workers' compensation coverage by
the university. 93 The scholarship and stipend are provided in ex-
change for the student's serving as a teacher for a designated num-
ber of classes. It is difficult to imagine that student-athletes who are
paid a stipend would be treated any differently.94
It appears that the adoption of the stipend proposal would
have a financial effect, albeit not a dramatic one, on NCAA member
universities. Student-athletes would suddenly transform into uni-
versity employees, thereby becoming eligible for workers' compen-
sation coverage. Although universities now regularly pick up the
bill for surgery and rehabilitation for athletic-related injuries of stu-
dent-athletes, participants in a sport as rough and violent as Divi-
sion I collegiate football are no strangers to paralysis and other
career-debilitating injuries, which can involve expensive payoffs by
employers for sophisticated medical procedures and loss of future
earning power. Universities would be wise, and perhaps compelled,
to contract with a private insurance carrier or pay into the state
90. For a discussion of the effects of successful athletic programs on universi-
ties, see supra note 6 and accompanying text.
91. See Goplerud, supra note 1, at 1099 (reasoning that athletes would then
likely "fall within existing definitions of 'employee'").
92. See id. (reasoning that teaching assistants are similarly situated to athletes
who would receive stipend).
93. See id.
94. See id. at 1100 (implying that student-athletes would be included in univer-
sities' Workers' Compensation coverage).
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workers' compensation fund, to cover the newly qualified student-
athletes. 95
IV. LABOR LAW ISSUES
Currently, scholarship student-athletes do not qualify as "em-
ployees" under the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA").96 How-
ever, if the NCAA adopted the stipend proposal, student-athletes
would more than likely meet the NLRA "employee" definition be-
cause they would be considered wage earners.97 The NLRA covers
employees in businesses which engage in interstate commerce. 98
This would give student-athletes the right to unionize and bargain
collectively. 99
If qualified as NLRA "employees," student-athletes receiving
stipend payments would have the right to select an exclusive collec-
95. See generally LAPSON, supra note 67; see also Goplerud, supra note 27, at 127
(discussing use of Workers' Compensation law to benefit student-athletes).
96. See Stephen L. Ukeiley, No Salary, No Union, No Collective Bargaining: Schol-
arship Athletes Are an Employer's Dream Come True, 6 SETON HALLJ. SPORT L. 167, 172
(1996) (relying on Rensing, which refused to acknowledge scholarship student-ath-
letes as "employees" under Indiana workman's compensation statute).
97. National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1994)). The NLRA defines "employee" as
follows:
The term "employee" shall include any employee, and shall not be lim-
ited to the employees of a particular employer, unless this subchapter
explicitly states otherwise, and shall include any individual whose work
has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with, any current labor
dispute or because of any unfair labor practice, and who has not obtained
any other regular and substantially equivalent employment, but shall not
include any individual employed as an agricultural laborer, or in the do-
mestic service of any family or person at his home, or any individual em-
ployed by his parent or spouse, or any individual having the status of an
independent contractor, or any individual employed as a supervisor, or
any individual employed by an employer subject to the Railroad Labor
Act, (45 U.S.C. § 151 et seq.) as amended from time to time, or by any
person who is not an employer as herein defined.
Id. § 152(3).
98. See Acain, supra note 2, at 317. Courts have long recognized that the
NCAA's activities involve interstate commerce. See id.
99. See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1994). This section provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and
shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities except
to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiting
membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as au-
thorized in section 158(a) (3) of this title.
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tive bargaining representative.10 0 They would negotiate the terms
and working conditions of their participation.1 01 Suddenly, to the
universities' chagrin, the amount of the stipend payments, transfer
rules, commercial endorsements, and the frequency, duration and
intensity of practices all potentially could enter the negotiating
landscape. 10 2 Similarly, educational issues such as the minimum
number of credits required to graduate and changes within the cur-
riculum would enter the landscape as well. 10 3 Absurd as it may be,
if a university and its student-athletes failed to reach an agreement
as to any or all of the negotiable terms, the NLRA would grant stu-
dent-athletes the option to strike.' 0 4 Imagine the bargaining lever-
age that would arise out of a threat by a highly ranked football team
to strike during an upcoming contest with an equally ranked oppo-
nent. In addition, what would be the bargaining units? 0 5 Offense
and defense? Starters and reserves? Linebackers and linemen? It
becomes readily evident that paying stipends to student-athletes
would create drastic factual issues under the NLRA.
V. TITLE IX ISSUES
Should the NCAA adopt the stipend proposal, gender equity
likely would compel universities to provide stipends for a propor-
tionate number of women student-athletes.10 6 Title IX requires not
only equal opportunities for participation, but also equal treatment
100. See id. § 159(a). The section provides:
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bar-
gaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such
purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in
such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect rates of pay,
wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment ....
Id.
101. See id. (allowing employees to have right to bargain collectively via their
chosen representatives).
102. See Ukeiley, supra note 96, at 216 (allowing student-athletes to become
employees suggests there will be labor disputes between schools and student-ath-
letes which will not be easily resolved).
103. See id. (noting that even though players can exercise employee rights,
Board can exclude all educational issues as negotiable). But see Regents of Univ. of
Mich. v. Mich. Employment Relations Comm'n, 389 Mich. 96 (1973) (prohibiting
bargaining dealing with education); see also Ukeiley, supra note 96, at 216 (noting
negotiations can be limited).
104. See 29 U.S.C. § 163 (1994) (providing that employees may engage in
"concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid
protection . . ").
105. See generally Mike Schinner, Are Athletic Scholarships Merely Disguised Com-
pensation?, 8 Am. J. TAx. POL'Y 127 (1990).
106. See id. at 127.
20001
17
Hurst: Payment of Student-Athletes: Legal & (and) Practical Obstacles
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2000
72 VILIANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAW JOURNAL
and benefits for athletes within collegiate programs.1 07 Universities
might attempt to draw a legal distinction between scholarships and
stipend payments in crafting an argument that "equality of opportu-
nity" under Title IX should be construed to mean equal opportu-
nity for women's sports teams to raise revenue, rather than equal
access to men's sports' revenues.108 However, due to the fact that
collegiate women's athletic teams generally do not generate profits,
it is unlikely that female student-athletes would have the same op-
portunities as male student-athletes to share in the revenue that
they generate, and courts would probably hold the universities to a
stringent Title IX test regarding the stipend proposal. 10 9 There-
fore, because each university would be providing stipend payments
to eighty-five football players alone, the number of Title IX stipend
payments made to female student-athletes would be quite substan-
tial. 110 Considering that basketball is the only women's sport which
generates revenue on the vast majority of Division I campuses, the
stipend proposal would carry with it an even more expensive price
tag.111
In determining whether universities would be in compliance
with Title IX concerning stipend payments, universities would have
to meet one of the three prongs of the "policy interpretation" test
announced in Cohen v. Brown University.1 12 This test calls for: (1)
substantial proportionality; (2) continuing practice of program ex-
107. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1994) (providing Title IX of the Education
Amendments Act of 1972 in part: "No person in the United States, shall, on the
basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Fed-
eral financial assistance .... ").
108. See Blair v. Wash. State Univ, 740 P.2d 1379 (Wash. 1987) (finding plan
requires university to create equal opportunity and raise revenue for both men's
and women's sports).
109. See Goplerud, supra note 27 at 130 (stating that inclusion of men's foot-
ball would assure significantly larger number of men receiving stipend).
110. See id. at 130 (stating that effects of this situation might provide impetus
to reduce number of scholarships provided for football). The NFL only allows
teams to have fifty-three players under contract during the regular season. See id.
at 130 n.68 (noting if NCAA reduces amount of scholarships available for Division
I football programs to fifty-three, cost of stipend payments would be substantially
reduced as thirty-two fewer stipends would be required to be paid to female stu-
dent-athletes). To alleviate concerns of significant attrition of scholarship football
players, either through injury or ineligibility related to academics or discipline
problems, walk-ons could fill out the remainder of the collegiate football roster.
See id.
111. See id.
112. 809 F. Supp. 978 (D.R.I. 1992).
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pansion; and (3) full and effective accommodation.1 13 If universi-
ties failed to satisfy the "policy implementation" test, thereby
violating Title IX, female student-athletes undoubtedly would sue
the universities requesting injunctive relief and monetary damages.
Due to financial hardships many universities are experiencing today
as a result of Title IX, gender equity continues to be a sizable hur-
dle confronting any stipend proposal.114
VI. TAXATION ISSUES
If universities began compensating student-athletes beyond the
amount of their athletic scholarships, both the student-athletes re-
ceiving the stipend payments and the universities themselves poten-
tially would be reporting more taxable income to the Internal
Revenue Service. Section 117(a) of the Internal Revenue Code ex-
cludes from gross income any amount received as a "qualified
scholarship."'1 15 Section 117, however, does not exclude those por-
113. See id. Defendant Brown University was charged with discriminating
against women within the intercollegiate athletic program in violation of Title IX.
See id. (demanding through injunction that defendant Brown University immedi-
ately restore women's gymnastics and volleyball as fully funded intercollegiate var-
sity teams).
114. See Goplerud, supra note 27, at 130 (stating gender equity practices
would be problematic because disproportionate benefits to men may lead to sanc-
tions on program).
115. See I.R.C. § 117(a) (Supp. III 1998). This section provides in relevant
part:
Qualified Scholarships.
(a) General Rule - Gross income does not include any amount received
as a qualified scholarship by an individual who is a candidate for a
degree at an educational organization described in section
170(b) (1) (A) (ii).
(b) Qualified Scholarship - For purposes of this section -
(1) In General - the term "qualified scholarship" means any amount
received by an individual as a scholarship or fellowship grant to
the extent the individual establishes that, in accordance with the
conditions of the grant, such amount was used for qualified tui-
tion and related expenses
(2) Qualified Tuition and Related Expenses - For purposes of para-
graph (1), the term "qualified tuition and related expenses"
means -
(A) tuition and fees required for the enrollment or attendance
of a student at an educational organization described in sec-
tion 170(b) (1) (A) (ii), and
(B) fees, books, supplies, and equipment required for courses
of instruction at such an educational organization.
(c) Limitation - Subsections (a) and (d) shall not apply to that portion
of any amount received which represents payment for teaching, re-
search, or other services by the student required as a condition for
receiving the qualified scholarship or qualified tuition reduction.
I.R.C. § 117(a) (Supp. III 1998).
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tions of an athletic scholarship constituting room and board from
gross income. 116 However, a paucity of student-athletes report the
amount of their room and board as income, and the IRS does not
pursue the issue. 117 In addition, it is widely recognized that all por-
tions of the athletic scholarship do not meet the exclusionary re-
quirements of section 117 because scholarship recipients are
required to perform athletic services as a condition of receiving
their scholarships. 118 Still, athletic scholarships remain untaxed,
and there is case law to support this aberration.11 9
However, if the NCAA adopted the stipend proposal, the sti-
pend amount would immediately constitute taxable income to the
stipend recipient.1 20 Although the tax liability to the student-ath-
letes would not be substantial, assuming that the stipend payment
itself was not an excessive amount, many student-athletes from low-
income families could ill afford to lose any amount of the stipend,
especially if these same student-athletes are spending the stipend
payments on necessities. 121 In addition, because the athletic schol-
arships are now taxable, universities would be required to handle
the ancillary burden of withholding for income tax as well as for
social security and Medicare. 122
More significant to the universities would be the potential ef-
fect of stipend payments on the universities' tax-exempt status. 123
Generally, an educational institution does not pay federal tax on
116. See id. (stating related expenses are included in generalized
scholarships).
117. See Schinner, supra note 105, at 155 (stating that expenditures other than
tuition, fees and books, such as room, board, or incidental expenses must be in-
cluded in recipient's gross income).
118. See I.R.C. § 117(c) (stating (a)-(d) do not apply when services by student
is condition for receiving scholarship or tuition reduction); see also Robert W. Lee,
The Taxation of Athletic Scholarships: An Uneasy Tension Between Benevolence and Consis-
tency, 37 U. FtA. L. REV. 591, 595 (1985) (stating section 117(c) applies to athletes
on scholarship because they must be degree candidates); Schinner, supra note 105,
at 144-48 (analyzing athletic scholarship as gross income under primary purpose
test, quid pro quo test and control test).
119. See Schinner, supra note 105, at 139 (stating that since enactment of sec-
tion 117 forty-five years ago, no court has specifically addressed issue of whether
athletic scholarships constitute taxable income). The Tax Court has tangentially
considered the issue on a few occasions but avoided taking it head-on each time.
See id.
120. See id. (stating Supreme Court believed Congress intended payments to
taxpayer should be taxed).
121. See Goplerud, supra note 27, at 131 (noting that stipend will provide
money for underprivileged student athletes).
122. See Goplerud, supra note 1, at 1103 (noting that stipend would be burden
on universities because stipends are taxable).
123. See Schinner, supra note 105, at 158 (noting it is unclear whether athletic
programs are unrelated business which could impose large tax liability on universi-
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income directly related to carrying out its educational mission. 124
However, on its unrelated business income, a tax-exempt organiza-
tion is taxed at the corporate rate. 125 The Internal Revenue Code
defines "unrelated business taxable income" as income derived
from (1) a "trade or business" that is (2) "regularly carried on," but
that is (3) "not substantially related" to the institution's tax-exempt
purposes.' 26
Paying stipends to student-athletes would further fuel the argu-
ments of those who have long advocated for the elimination of the
tax-exempt status for collegiate athletics, as the payments to the stu-
dent-athletes potentially could tarnish the concept of amateurism,
and the educational objectives of athletic scholarships, to such a
degree that the universities' athletic programs would no longer be
"substantially related" to the universities' tax-exempt purposes. 27
The loss of tax-exempt status would reduce a large portion of the
annual profits of many universities. 128
VII. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
If the stipend proposal were adopted and the universities be-
gan paying stipends to student-athletes in revenue-producing
sports, with a proportionate number of female student-athletes in
order to comply with Title IX, a student-athlete in a non-revenue
sport potentially could mount an Equal Protection challenge
against a university.' 29
ties); see also Goplerud, supra note 1, at 1102 (suggesting tax expenses as conse-
quence to schools).
124. See I.R.C. § 501(a) (1997). Education is defined as relating to: "(a) The
instruction or training of the individual for the purpose of improving or develop-
ing his capabilities; or (b) The instruction of the public on subjects useful to the
individual and beneficial to the community." Treas. Reg. § 1.501 (c) (3)-1(3) (3) (i).
125. See I.R.C. § 501 (a) (1) (1997) (stating in order to exempt, organization
must fit within education definition of § 501 (c) (3)); see also Schinner, supra note
105, at 158-59 (stating educational organizations usually do not pay federal income
tax on income directly related to is educational purposcs).
126. I.R.C. § 511(b) (1997); see also Schinner, supra note 105, at 158 (stating
within first two elements of Code's definition, athletic programs and many factors
like profitability and scope determine third prong).
127. See Schinner, supra note 105, at 109 (stating if professional athlete pro-
gram produces large profits, its size is over adequate size necessary for its educa-
tional goals, then activity will probably be unrelated trade or business).
128. See id. at 159 (noting tax liability generated by football team alone at a
university would exceed $1 million annually).
129. See Goplerud, supra note 27, at 130 (noting disproportionate benefits to
men can expose program to sanctions or liability).
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VIII. VICARIOUS LIABILITY ISSUES
Another legal issue which would flow out of the adoption of
the stipend proposal would be the universities' potential respondeat
superior liability for injuries and misconduct by student-athletes. 130
Student-athletes would be considered employees of the universities
upon the receipt of their first stipend payment. 31 As employees,
student-athletes also may be deemed agents of their employers -
the universities.1 32 Therefore, if a collegiate football player injured
a player on an opposing team, it would be possible that the univer-
sity could face liability, unless a court determined that the student-
athlete was acting outside the scope of his employment. However,
because of the violent nature of the "employment" of Division I col-
lege football, the injured plaintiff probably would be required to
prove gross negligence. In addition, it would seem that the assump-
tion of risk doctrine would be an effective affirmative defense for
the university. Still, universities would certainly feel uneasy about
this new source of potential liability, no matter how unlikely a suc-
cessful plaintiffs verdict.
IX. PRACTICAL ISSUES
Paying stipends to student-athletes in revenue-producing
sports and a proportionate number of female student-athletes
would be expensive. Experts have estimated that the cost to all Divi-
sion I universities would be $30 million annually.' 33 However, not
all universities are as fortunate as the University of Florida in reap-
ing millions of dollars in profits from campus athletics each year. 134
The athletic departments of many universities have been operating
at a loss since the advent of Tide IX.' 35 In fact, a recent study re-
vealed that over 60% of Division I universities and over 80% of all
130. See id. (noting that existence of increased exposure to liability would
likely cause schools to be uneasy about stipend plan).
131. For a discussion of the potential employment relationship between stu-
dent-athlete and university, see supra notes 66-95 and accompanying text.
132. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1 (1995).
133. See Ivan Maisel, Don't Expect Athletes to be Paid Anytime Soon, SPORTING
NEWS, Apr. 10, 1995, at 52 (stating estimation was based on annual stipend pay-
ment of $3600 or monthly stipend payments of $300 and noting impact to individ-
ual budgets might approach $400,000 annually); see also Goplerud, supra note 27,
at 131 (stating about $29 million annually would cover cost of Division I athletic
stipends).
134. See Goplerud, supra note 27, at 126 n.17 (stating University of Michigan
receives $28 million annually in athletic budgets).
135. See id. at 131 (noting if athletes are employees, they then can bring law-
suits under Title IX and Sherman Act).
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universities are operating their athletic programs at a loss without
the added burden of providing stipend payments.13 6 Support for
the non-revenue producing sports would be jeopardized at those
universities struggling financially to make the stipend payments,
and such universities would be compelled to eliminate a number of
non-revenue sports teams altogether. Title IX requirements would
demand that the majority of the eliminated sports teams be male
teams. Other universities may determine that stipend payments
would be cost-prohibitive and instead form their own "non-stipend"
leagues.' 3 7 Such a response would spell the end of historical con-
ference alignments and traditional rivalries. Other commentators
have suggested that new sources of revenue should be sought to
make the stipend payment affordable. 138 These suggestions, many
of them unpleasant to university administrators, have included in-
creasing student activity fees, tuition and ticket prices, soliciting
corporate benefactors, creating a national championship football
playoff, reducing available football scholarships, and requesting
professional leagues such as the NBA, NFL and the WNBA to pro-
vide support in recognition that collegiate athletics have long been
the "minor leagues.' 1 39
Purists fear that paying student-athletes would be the death
knell of the fading ideal of "amateurism" in collegiate athletics. 140
Adopting the stipend proposal, purists argue, would make college
sports no different from the professional leagues.' 4 ' Judith Albino,
former President of the NCAA, said, I can't imagine we are moving
in that direction [of paying student-athletes]. Doing that would
fundamentally change what we are about. If we pay players, we are
no longer educational institutions." 142 Purists have also expressed
136. See Steve Kelly, Fiesta Time to Celebrate College Footbal SEATTLE TIMES, Jan.
2, 1996, at CI; see also Barra, supra note 1, at A26 (noting how NCAA rules work to
benefit of professional sports' leagues).
137. See Goplerud, supra note 1, at 1102 (acknowledging enormous practical
and financial difficulties presented by his proposal).
138. See id. at 1104 (noting purpose of university is to learn).
139. See Goplerud, supra note 27, at 131 (suggesting that universities look for
creative ways in cutting administrative and travel expenses).
140. See Goplerud, supra note 1, at 1104 (commenting that corporate spon-
sors like Nike could be considered supporters of program).
141. See id. at 1102. Purists argue that "any denigration of the amateurism
concept is against step towards the destruction of intercollegiate athletics." Id.
142. Thomas O'Toole, Paying Players Opposed: NCAA Mulls Eligibility, COM. AP-
PEAL (Memphis),Jan. 8, 1995, at D12; see also Goplerud, supra note 27, at 130 (com-
menting on number of well-respected football coaches, notably Tom Osborne of
University of Nebraska and Don Nehlen of University of West Virginia, who have
publicly supported idea of paying student-athletes).
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concern that the denigration of "amateurism" on the college level
would eventually pervade high school athletics as well and make
high school sports vulnerable to the same abuses. 143
It is possible that if universities began paying student-athletes,
tension on campus potentially would erupt between the student-
athletes in the stipend sports and those in the non-stipend sports.
The traditional strong sense of community among student-athletes
at universities would be jeopardized if the majority of student-ath-
letes felt like second-rate participants to the minority of their sti-
pend-receiving peers. Furthermore, it is possible that a student-
athlete who joins a team as a non-scholarship walk-on would feel
hostility toward his or her own teammates who are receiving sti-
pends, thereby destroying team chemistry.
Lastly, the NCAA may align itself in opposition to the stipend
proposal in the interest of bureaucratic self-preservation. Permit-
ting payment of student-athletes would make many NCAA regula-
tions and enforcement mechanisms obsolete.14 4 It is doubtful that
the paternalistic NCAA will ever willingly give up its place at the
center of collegiate athletics.
X. THE AUTHORS' PROPOSAL
The authors would incorporate both elements, need and fair-
ness, in the proposal to pay student-athletes beyond the current al-
lowable amount of the athletic scholarship. We would offer
Division I universities the opportunity to pay all student-athletes a
small amount of spending money, perhaps $30-$50 per month, as
part of their athletic scholarship. Unlike a stipend payment, which
resembles a wage for services rendered, the amount would re-
present "laundry money" such as was allowed in the 1970s and
would fall under the new NCAA definition of "athletic scholarship,"
along with tuition, fees, room, board and books. Because the "laun-
143. See Goldman, supra note 6, at 245 (noting there is no national agreement
prohibiting payments to high school athletes that is policed by elaborate investiga-
tive and enforcement mechanism). Although there is a National Federal of State
High School Association, it is an informal organization which lacks the power and
revenues of the NCAA. See id.
144. See Barra, supra note 1, at A26. The article states:
The modern-day NCAA has its origin in the years immediately after
World War 1I, when concern grew over the infiltration of college sports
by gamblers. Fearing the loss of credibility with ticket buyers, the colleges
gave the NCAA the power to investigate cheating and to deal with the
threat, much as baseball owners gave power to the commissioner's office
... after the 1919 Black Sox scandal.
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dry money" would represent a scholarship feature, and not wages,
student-athletes would avoid the label "employees" under both the
workers' compensation statutes and the NLRA, as well as under any
vicarious liability theory. A successful challenger under the Sher-
man Antitrust Act would have to convince a court to depart from
the reasoning expounded in the Board of Regents of the University of
Oklahoma and McCurrmack opinions. Title IX would not offer any
resistance because all student-athletes, male and female, would re-
ceive the "laundry money." Payment to all student-athletes would
also negate any feelings of animosity or jealousy among teammates
and peers, with the possible exception of non-scholarship student
athletes if the universities decided not to offer them "laundry
money." The "laundry money" would certainly qualify as gross in-
come under section 117 of the Internal Revenue Code, but until
the IRS chooses to enforce the taxation of non-exempt scholarship
amounts, student-athletes should not feel obligated to report any
amount of their athletic scholarships. Although the "laundry
money" would not satisfy the needs of many of today's student-ath-
letes, it would provide enough cash for an occasional date, or gas or
bus money for an emergency trip home.
Offering "laundry money" (in the $30-$50 range) to all stu-
dent-athletes would cost each university less than $100,000 per year,
and therefore would not financially cripple most Division I universi-
ties. However, if a university could simply not afford to include
"laundry money" as part of its athletic scholarship, it could choose
to exclude it. It is doubtful that a recruit would choose not to at-
tend a university that he or she otherwise likes for its sports team,
coach and educational opportunities because that university does
not offer $30 per month in "laundry money." Each university could
also choose whether to offer the full allowable amount of "laundry
money" to partial scholarship holders and walk-ons or to pay the
"laundry money" in an amount proportionate to the amount of the
scholarship.
LT-..".. ED, T0o -..r .t "S .Co -,unk--,ns UV-%tP in n r cnt NCAA
J11 I I .JL X'.3 L .&.JI 'JS 1 i ado m --- a -e ---- _1 __
newsletter, "We've [the NCAA] got more assets to sell corporate
America than any professional league or professional team will ever
have. 1 45 This Article's proposal incorporates a revenue-sharing
scheme to address such NCAA ostentation and the larger issue of
fairness to the under-compensated student-athletes in the revenue-
producing sports. This proposal would make available to student-
athletes a reasonable percentage of revenue derived each year from
145. Id.
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the football bowls, the men's and women's NCAA basketball tour-
naments, and shoe and apparel contracts. For example, if the Uni-
versity of Florida football team received $3 million for its invitation
to play in the 2000 Orange Bowl, the student-athletes on that team
(and that team only) would receive a small percentage of that pay-
out. However if the 2001 University of Florida football team failed
to receive a bowl invitation, the student-athletes on that team would
not receive any funds. The same scheme would operate for the stu-
dent-athletes on the men's and women's basketball teams and the
existence and amount of any payout would be dependent on an
invitation to and success in the NCAA men's and women's basket-
ball tournaments. Likewise, the athletes would receive a percent-
age of any shoe or apparel contracts operating at the time of their
participation in the tournaments.
The amount of money required to be paid to female student-
athletes would naturally depend on the success of the men's foot-
ball and basketball teams and the women's basketball teams. It is
entirely possible that Title IX would not be a concern in a given
year. For example, if the University of Florida women's basketball
team received an invitation to the 2001 NCAA tournament, but the
football and men's basketball teams failed to obtain post-season
play, the University of Florida would not need to pay any female
student-athletes other than those who participated on the women's
basketball team. A much different scenario, however, would pre-
sent itself if, for example, both the University of Florida football
and men's basketball teams received a bowl and NCAA tournament
invitation, respectively, but the women's basketball team failed to
receive an NCAA tournament invitation. In this situation, the Uni-
versity of Florida would have to pay female student-athletes the
same amount that was paid to the football and men's basketball
players. Rather than randomly choose the female student-athletes
paid in order to comply with Title IX, the university should pay an
equal amount to each female student-athlete in all sports.
This proposal seems very expensive, but any money paid to stu-
dent-athletes is derived directly from revenue. 146 Rather than en-
joying the entire $3 million received from the 2000 Orange Bowl,
for instance, the University of Florida would "only" retain a large
percentage of that $3 million. In addition, the proposal would in-
clude a recommendation that all Division I universities reduce avail-
able football scholarships from eighty-five scholarships to fifty-five
146. Because this money is derived from revenue and not included as part of
a team's scholarship program, this aspect is different from the stipend proposal.
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scholarships in order to reduce the effect of Title IX on the propo-
sal. 147 Also, the NCAA should seek new sources of revenue, such as
Division I football playoffs and wealthier corporate sponsors.1 48
In addition, the amount received by these revenue-generating
student-athletes and their Title IX counterparts should be a rather
small percentage, perhaps in the 10%-15% range of revenue gener-
ated by the student-athletes' sports teams. A low percentage would
both allow the student-athletes to "share in the fruits of their labor"
as well as allow the universities to retain the lion's share of the reve-
nue which they need to pay the female student-athletes to meet Ti-
tle IX compliance and to support the remaining non-revenue
athletic teams, male and female. Each university would have the
option of not offering the revenue-sharing scheme to its student
athletes. In addition, the percentage (10%-15%) would act as a
"salary cap" so that universities could choose to share any percent-
age of revenue, not to exceed 10%-15%.
Assuming that the revenue-sharing plan had the support of the
student-athletes and any existing collective bargaining representa-
tive, the "salary cap" structure would probably avoid any antitrust
litigation under the non-statutory labor exemption. 149 Further-
more, the NCAA and the student-athletes should come to an agree-
ment that only revenue-sharing issues would be permitted at the
negotiation table and not any academic or practice require-
ments. 150 Although this proposal would seem to separate the
"haves" from the "have-nots," each year would be a new year under
the proposal. A men's basketball coach could counter a recruit's
concern about the school's team not receiving any revenue by tell-
ing the recruit that "next year will be different." Preserving compe-
tition is another reason for keeping the "salary cap" at a relatively
low amount.
147. See Goplerud, supra note 27, at 130 n.68 (noting that NFL has fifty-three
players under contract during season but are permitted eighty players under con-
tract during time of training camp; therefore, universities should be limited to
NFL standards).
148. See Goplerud, supra note 1, at 1104 (admitting that absorbing cost of
stipend will be difficult, but schools can find sources of revenue and support sti-
pend program).
149. See id. at 1089-90 (finding that, in appropriate circumstances, some re-
strictive activities by NCAA may be permitted because nature of competitive sports
allows for restrictions such as squad size, size of field, academic standards, length
of season, and number of scholarships, in order to foster competition).
150. See generally Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Mich. Employment Relations
Comm'n, 389 Mich. 96 (1973).
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The proposal should not have a dramatic financial effect on
universities in terms of worker's compensation or taxes. Even if the
courts began to recognize student-athletes as "employees" under
workers' compensation statutes, the universities should be able to
insure themselves adequately. Although a revenue-sharing plan be-
tween the universities and the student-athletes may cast doubt upon
the universities' long enjoyed tax-exempt status, it is likely that the
NCAA could finance a lobbying group to preclude the IRS from
categorizing athletic revenue as "unrelated business income." Still,
it is advisable that the NCAA obtain a tax opinion from the IRS
before adopting the revenue-sharing proposal.
Finally, to prevent the death of the "amateurism" ideal, eligible
student-athletes should not receive their share in revenue immedi-
ately upon the completion of their team's season, nor upon the
completion of the school year. Rather, any share in revenue should
be deposited in a trust account until the student-athletes graduate
or otherwise complete their collegiate careers. Under such an ar-
rangement, student-athletes would retain their amateur status
throughout their college playing days, similar to "amateur" million-
aires in non-NCAA track and field events. 151 Until graduation, stu-
dent-athletes would rely on their "laundry-money" for necessities.
The proposal to pay student-athletes combines a simple need-
based scheme with a significantly more complex equitable scheme.
Although universities would encounter difficulties implementing
this proposal, the day to compensate student-athletes fairly has ar-
rived along with the commercial reality of collegiate athletics. The
proposal is not intended to bankrupt collegiate athletic programs
but rather to create a revenue-sharing relationship between the uni-
versities and the student-athletes, the true producers behind the big
bucks.
151. For a discussion of the conflict between NCAA amateurs' perceptions
and the NCAA's definition of "amateurism," see supra note 13.
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